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Abstract
Higher retail prices are frequently cited as a cost of living in poor, mi-
nority neighborhoods. However, the empirical evidence, which primarily
comes from the grocery gap literature on food prices, has been mixed.
This study uses new data on retail gasoline prices in three major U.S.
cities to provide evidence on the relationship between neighborhood char-
acteristics and consumer prices. We ﬁnd that gasoline prices do not vary
greatly with neighborhood racial composition, but that prices are higher
in poor neighborhoods. For a 10 percentage point increase in the percent
of families with incomes below the poverty line relative to families with
incomes between 1 and 2 times the poverty line, retail gasoline prices are
estimated to increase by an average of 0.70 percent. This diﬀerential is
reduced to 0.22 percent once we add controls for costs, competition, and
demand. Finally, we provide evidence that the remaining, small, price
diﬀerential for poor neighborhoods is likely the result of traditional price
discrimination in response to less competition and/or more inelastic de-
mand in these locations.
JEL Classiﬁcation: J15, J16
Keywords: consumer prices, consumer market discrimination, race dis-
crimination, price discrimination, redlining
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is to be poor...Go shopping one day in Harlem– for anything– and compare
Harlem prices and quality with those downtown.
James Baldwin, Nobody Knows My Name, 1961
It’s not that these businesses are saying ‘You, black people, you get out of my
[establishment].’ They are saying ‘Come on in, but we’re going to rip you oﬀ.’
Allison Bethel, Florida Assistant Attorney General, in U.S. News and World Report, 2000
1 Introduction
The economics literature on discrimination in consumer markets is dominated
by studies of diﬀerences in negotiated prices in two markets: housing (e.g.,
Yinger, 1986, 1995; Ondrich et al., 2003; Myers, 2004) and automobiles (e.g.,
Ayres and Siegelman, 1995; Goldberg, 1996). A few additional studies examine
price diﬀerentials in smaller markets in which prices are also negotiated such
as trading cards (List, 2004) and car repairs (Gneezy and List, 2004). Less
evidence is available from the numerous consumer markets in which prices are
publicly posted and ﬁxed. In this situation, individually targeted racial price
discrimination is unlikely because, as Siegelman (1998) points out, it would re-
quire the ﬂagrant and illegal display of diﬀerent prices for whites and minorities.
However, ﬁrms may still adopt practices that increase the probability that mi-
norities or other targeted groups will pay higher prices. We use data on gasoline
prices and station characteristics from three metropolitan areas to test for one
such practice, commonly referred to as “retail redlining.”
Following D’Rozario and Williams (2005), we deﬁne “retail redlining” as a
practice among retailers that results in lower quality goods and services and/or
higher prices in areas with large minority or poor populations. Claims of retail
redlining arise regularly in both academic sources and the popular press, often
involving catch phrases such as “the poor pay more,” ”the high price of poverty,”
or “the poorer you are the more things cost” (e.g., Sturdivant, 1969; Downing,
12007; Brown, 2009). Accusations of retail redlining also arise in courtrooms,
and politics. GM, Wal-Mart, Burger King, Domino’s Pizza, and KB Toys have
been sued for discriminatory practices in minority neighborhoods (Jelisavcic,
1996; Smith, 1996; Fuller, 1998; Kaplan, 2000); in 1992 the mayor of Los Angeles
touted the need for more equal access to supermarkets following the Los Angeles
riots; and, in 2009, Illinois Senator Roland Burris introduced a request to the
annual federal appropriations bill for a campaign to ﬁght retail redlining on
Chicago’s south side (Shaﬀer, 2002; Burris, 2009).
The bulk of the empirical evidence on retail redlining comes from the large
“grocery gap” literature, which explores variations across neighborhoods in the
accessibility, quality, and price of food sold at grocery stores. Much of this
evidence suggests that grocery prices are higher in inner-city neighborhoods
and that this is largely explained by the lack of large chain stores in these areas
(Hall, 1983; Kaufman et al., 1997; Chung and Myers, 1999; Shaﬀer, 2002). By
contrast, (Hayes, 2000), using a large nationally representative sample of price
data from the sampling frame used to construct the Consumer Price Index,
ﬁnds that prices are lower in poor neighborhoods but that the discount is not
constant across races. Poor whites and Hispanics receive discounts, but poor
blacks pay similar prices as aﬄuent whites. Turning to the market for prepared
food, Graddy (1997) ﬁnds that fast food meal prices increase by about 5 percent
for a 50 percentage point increase in the percent black in a zip code.
While food, which makes up a large portion of consumer budgets, is an
important candidate for study of inter-neighborhood price variations, accusa-
tions of retail redlining extend beyond this single market. We provide evidence
from a hitherto unexamined market: retail gasoline. There are several reasons
to consider retail gasoline beyond the beneﬁts of deviating from the extensive
literature on food prices. First, like groceries, gasoline makes up a relatively
large portion of the average consumer budget: 4.8 percent as compared to 7.0
2percent for food purchased for home consumption (U.S. Department of Labor,
Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2008). Moreover, gasoline represents an important
commodity for the poor as well as for the more well-to-do. Private vehicles are
the dominant mode of travel even among households with annual income be-
low $20,000; three-quarters of these households own at least one vehicle, three
quarters of their travel is done in private vehicles, and gasoline makes up 5.1
percent of their consumption expenditures (Pucher and Renne, 2003; U.S. De-
partment of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2008). A second reason for
considering the market for gasoline is that the grocery gap literature is compli-
cated by the heterogeneity of stores, products, and quality. Gasoline stations
are considerably more homogenous in terms of size and, after controlling for
branding, quality. This allows us to more precisely identify price diﬀerentials
for an identical good. Finally, anecdotal evidence and accusations in the popu-
lar press suggest that gasoline prices vary between stations and neighborhoods
(e.g., Douglas and Cohn, 2005; Rose, 2007), and any such variations have the
potential to be correlated with race and income characteristics.
We combine three sources of survey data to produce a panel of daily price
observations over the course of a year for nearly all of the gas stations in the
Atlanta, Detroit, and Philadelphia metropolitan areas. We examine the re-
lationship between prices and neighborhood racial and income characteristics
with additional controls for costs and demand. The results indicate that prices
do not vary greatly with neighborhood racial composition, but that prices are
slightly higher in poorer neighborhoods.
2 A model of retail redlining
As deﬁned, retail redlining describes only the presence of inter-neighborhood
price diﬀerentials, not their source. Such price diﬀerentials may represent
3animus-based discrimination or price discrimination in response to variation
in the elasticity of demand. However, inter-neighborhood price diﬀerentials also
may arise in perfectly competitive markets due to diﬀerences in costs between
neighborhoods. In fact, ﬁrms accused of retail redlining on the basis of race
often respond by claiming that, to the extent that price diﬀerentials exist, they
are the result of cost-related factors such as crime (D’Rozario and Williams,
2005).
To account for these possibilities, we adopt the ﬂexible model used by
Graddy (1997) and based on the “new empirical industrial organization” as
described by Bresnahan (1989). Price setting conduct of ﬁrm i in market area




Qijtθijt = MCijt (1)
where Pjt is the price in market area j at time t, ∂P(Qjt)/∂Qjt is the derivative
of the inverse demand function, Qijt is quantity sold by ﬁrm i, and MC is
marginal cost for ﬁrm i. θijt indexes ﬁrm competitiveness, with increasing values
reﬂecting increasing distance from perfect competition. For instance, if θijt =0 ,
a ﬁrm follows the perfectly competitive strategy of equating price to marginal
cost. If θijt = 1, a ﬁrm follows the monopoly strategy of equating monopoly
marginal revenue to marginal cost (for a full discussion, see Bresnahan, 1989).
Assuming constant elasticity of demand,  , Qijt can be substituted out and
Equation 1 can be expressed as Pjt = MCijt/[ 1+( 1 / )θijt]. Taking logs,
log(Pjt)=log(MCijt) − log(1 + (1/ )θijt). (2)
Our last step is to introduce the possibility of animus-based discrimination
by incorporating a discrimination coeﬃcient ` a la Becker (1957). Let bj ∈ [0,1]
be the proportion of residents of neighborhood j who are black and let d ∈ [0,1]
4represent the discrimination coeﬃcient for ﬁrms. Firms act as if the price they
receive in neighborhood j at time t is Pjt(1 − dbj) so that in the presence of
discriminatory ﬁrms (d>0), ﬁrms act as if marginal revenue is decreasing in
the black population of a neighborhood. Equation 2 now can be written as
log(Pjt)=log(MCijt) − log( 1+( 1 / )θijt) − log(1 − dbj). (3)
If we assume that neighborhoods represent individual market areas, prices
could be higher in neighborhood j for four reasons: (1) higher marginal costs,
(2) less competition, (3) less elastic demand in the presence of imperfect com-
petition, which allows for classic price discrimination, or (4) a greater presence
of some attribute (e.g., race) on which all ﬁrms engage in animus-based discrim-
ination. Our empirical strategy is to ﬁrst determine whether there is evidence
of price variation between neighborhoods with diﬀerent racial and income com-
positions. To the extent that any such diﬀerentials remain after controlling
for costs and competitiveness, we discuss and explore whether they represent
animus-based discrimination.
3 Data
We combine three sources of data: gasoline price data from Oil Price Infor-
mational Service (OPIS), neighborhood characteristics from the 2000 Decennial
Census, and individual station characteristics obtained via telephone survey.
Gasoline price data were purchased from OPIS, which monitors retail gaso-
line prices across the United States and Canada by observing “ﬂeet card” trans-
actions: special credit card transactions for groups of vehicles owned or leased
by businesses or government agencies. The data include daily price observa-
tions for regular unleaded gasoline purchased between December 1, 2007 and
November 30, 2008 at stations in three metropolitan areas: Atlanta, Detroit,
5and Philadelphia. A station enters the OPIS sample on any day in which a ﬂeet
card is used to purchase gasoline there. Because ﬂeet card transactions are quite
common, OPIS estimates that nearly all of the gasoline stations and convenience
stores in a metropolitan area will incur at least one ﬂeet card transaction in a
year and, hence, be represented in the sample. The exceptions will primarily be
stations that do not accept credit cards.
The raw gasoline price data form an unbalanced panel of 1.4 million station-
price observations for 5,736 unique stations. Of these, 322 stations are observed
on fewer than 20 days and have been dropped from the sample. Some of these
stations appear to have entered or exited the market during the sample period,
while others appear to be automobile dealerships where ﬂeet cards are occasion-
ally used to purchase gasoline. The data also include the name and brand of
the station and the station address.
Information about the area surrounding each gasoline station was collected
using ArcGIS software and census data. ArcGIS was used to identify the ge-
ographic coordinates of each station based on the street address provided by
OPIS. Of the 5,414 stations observed twenty or more times by OPIS, the coor-
dinates of 96.5 percent of the stations could be identiﬁed in this manner; the
remaining 191 stations also have been dropped from the sample. ArcGIS was
then used to note the number of nearby competing stations and the distance
to major roads. Finally, the census tract containing each station was identiﬁed
based on the station’s geographic coordinates, and variables measuring census
tract characteristics were collected from the 2000 U.S. Census. An additional 20
stations have been dropped from the sample because complete characteristics
of the surrounding census tract were not available.
Data measuring individual station characteristics such as capacity and the
presence of a car wash were collected by telephone survey of a subsample of sta-
tions. Undergraduate students contacted a random subsample of 1,745 stations
6by phone and asked a brief series of survey questions which are reproduced in
Appendix A. Of the contacted stations, 1,131 either had an invalid phone num-
ber, declined to begin the survey, or began but did not complete the survey. Six
hundred and fourteen, or 35 percent, of the surveys were completed. However,
42 of these stations were later dropped from the sample because we could not
identify their geographic coordinates using ArcGIS or because they were ob-
served fewer than 20 times during the sampled year. An additional 5 stations
were dropped because the telephone surveyor mis-coded a variable.1
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for stations in the ﬁnal sample. After
removing stations with limited price observations or incomplete geographic vari-
ables, there are 5,203 station observations (2,288 in Atlanta, 1,612 in Detroit,
and 1,302 in Philadelphia). The average station is observed on 250 of the 366
possible days in the sample period (which covers a leap year). The available
variables measure or proxy for the price of gasoline, neighborhood racial and
income characteristics, costs, the level of competitiveness, and demand. We
describe the variables in more detail below.
Price
OPIS records the price posted at the pump, which is inclusive of applicable
gasoline taxes and exclusive of any discounts or rebates that may be oﬀered to
ﬂeet card holders. In the period and metropolitan areas covered by the sample,
applicable gasoline taxes include a federal excise tax and state taxes that can
include excise taxes, state sales tax, and environmental surcharges. Local taxes
are applied in only one of the four states in the sample, Georgia, were they
range from 6 to 7 percent and are pre-paid based on the state’s announced
average sales price of gasoline. We calculate the price net of all taxes using
1Response to the telephone surveys is clearly non-random. However, as shown in Table 1,
the observable characteristics of surveyed stations are quite similar to those of non-surveyed
stations.
7information from the American Petroleum Institute and Georgia Department
of Revenue (The American Petroleum Institute, 2009; Georgia Department of
Revenue, 2007a,b, 2008, 2009). Because the incidence of state and local taxes
falls almost entirely on consumers (Chouinard and Perloﬀ, 2004), we choose to
use the net price as the outcome variable in our analysis with the assumption
that it more accurately reﬂects the pricing behavior of retailers. However, not
surprisingly given the limited local variation in taxes in the sample, the results
are quite similar using gross price and state indicator variables. As reported
in Table 1, the average price of gasoline over the course of the year in which
stations were observed was $3.34 inclusive of taxes and $2.86 exclusive of taxes.
Racial and income characteristics
The racial composition of the census tract surrounding a station was obtained
from the 2000 U.S. Census. Respondents classify themselves into one or more of
multiple racial and ethnic categories, which we use to create four mutually ex-
clusive and collectively exhaustive categories: white, black, Hispanic, and other.
The percent white in a tract measures the percent of respondents reporting that
they are non-Hispanic and white alone; similarly, the percent black in a tract
measures the percent of respondents who are non-Hispanic and black alone. The
percent “other” is the percent of non-Hispanic respondents reporting that they
are Asian, American Indian, some other single race, or more than one race.2 The
percent Hispanic is the percent of residents belonging to any racial category who
reported that they are Hispanic. Table 1 includes summary statistics for these
variables; the average station in the sample is located in a neighborhood that is
69 percent white, 21 percent black, 5 percent Hispanic, and 5 percent other.
Turning to income, we use a set of three income variables from the census
that measure the percent of families in a census tract with incomes placing
2Fewer than 2 percent of respondents in the sample indicated that they belonged to multiple
racial categories.
8them below the poverty line (poor), between the poverty line and two times
the poverty line (lower-middle income), and above two times the poverty line
(middle-upper income). Using these three categories allows for a non-linear
relationship similar to that reported by Frankel and Gould (2001), who found
that retails prices are increasing with both the percent of families who are poor
and who are middle-upper income. As reported in the summary statistics in
Table 1, the average station is located in a neighborood in which 10 percent
of families are poor, 14 percent are lower-middle income, and 76 percent are
middle-upper income.3
Costs
Three quarters of the retail price of gasoline is accounted for by the wholesale
price of reﬁned gasoline (Energy Information Administration, 2009). Time ﬁxed
eﬀects account for temporal ﬂuctuations in the price of crude oil, while state
ﬁxed eﬀects account for diﬀerences in the wholesale price of gasoline arising
due to regional variation in the costs of crude oil, reﬁning, and transportation.
However, the wholesale price of gasoline paid by individual stations also varies
within a metropolitan area at any given time due to variation in branding and
the ownership structure, which we describe.
Branded gasoline stations, which make up about 83 percent of the market,
display the name of a major reﬁner or wholesale marketer such as Shell or
Texaco and sell the wholesaler’s brand of gasoline, which includes proprietary
additives (Kleit, 2003). Branded gasoline stations can roughly be divided into
one of three ownership structures: owned and operated by the wholesaler (19
percent of branded stations nationwide), owned by the wholesaler and leased by
an independent dealer (20 percent of branded stations), and owned and operated
3Because so many respondents fall in the middle-upper income bracket, it would be prefer-
able to divide it into smaller categories. However, the Census Bureau does not provide a more
detailed breakdown of family income distributions above two times the poverty line.
9by an independent dealer (61 percent of branded stations) (Meyer and Fischer,
2004). Stations in the ﬁrst two categories typically receive gasoline directly from
the wholesaler, while stations in the last category typically receive gasoline from
“jobbers,” independent contractors who gain the right to franchise a brand in
a certain area. Unbranded stations, which make up the remaining 17 percent
of the gasoline market, typically purchase gasoline from a reﬁner that does not
have a branded presence in the retail gasoline market (Kleit, 2003).
Branded stations that are supplied directly by the wholesaler may be sub-
ject to “zone pricing,” a practice in which branded wholesalers deﬁne a price
zone as a contiguous set of stations within a small geographic area that face a
similar market environment. A wholesaler charges all direct-supplied retailers
in the price zone a common wholesale price (Meyer and Fischer, 2004). Zone-
pricing clearly suggests the existence of inter-neighborhood price diﬀerentials.
However, retailers who buy from unbranded wholesalers or jobbers at a uniform
regional wholesale price still presumably price retail gasoline according to local
market conditions. To the extent that zone pricing reﬂects market conditions
but does not itself increase market power, one would expect inter-neighborhood
variation in prices regardless of whether zone pricing is employed in a certain
neighborhood.4.
To account for diﬀerences in wholesale prices due to branded status, we
include a single branded variable that indicates a station sells branded gasoline.5
Accounting for price diﬀerences due to ownership structure is more diﬃcult,
and we only attempt to do so with stations that were surveyed by telephone.
4For more detailed theoretical and empirical evidence on ownership structure and retail
prices, see Shepard (1991); Taylor (2000); Kleit (2003); Meyer and Fischer (2004)
5The branded variable indicates that a station displays one of the following brands: BP,
Chevron, Citgo, Conoco, Exxon, Getty, Gulf, Hess, Lukoil, Marathon Ashland, Mobil, Phillips
66, Shell, Sunoco, Texaco, and Valero. The results are robust to substituting a series of
indicators for each of the 19 speciﬁc retail station types that are observed most at least thirty
times in the data: 7-eleven, BP, Chevron, Citgo, Clark, Exxon, Getty, Gulf, Hess, Kroger,
Lukoil, Marathon, Mobil, Quik Trip, Racetrac, Sams, Shell, Speedway, Sunoco, Texas, Valero,
and Wawa.
10It is not feasible to collect information on ownership structure and wholesale
supply via telephone because many station employees are not aware of this type
of information. Instead, we asked the employee answering the phone whether
the station owner regularly works behind the counter and assume that stations
where this is the case are more likely to be operated by an independent dealer.
We also collected information on three variables that Taylor (2000) found to be
correlated with ownership structure because of their relationship to monitoring
eﬀort. These are indicators for whether the station has repair bays (as proxied
by oﬀering oil changes), full service pumps, and a convenience store (as proxied
by selling milk by the gallon).6 Stations oﬀering repair service or full service
are more likely to be owned or leased by an independent dealer, while stations
with a convenience store are more likely to be owned and operated by a branded
wholesaler (Taylor, 2000).
In addition to variables controlling for brand and proxying for ownership
structure, we include several other controls for costs. Real estate costs are
represented by the log of the median value of owner-occupied housing in the
surrounding census tract. Population density, which is correlated with house
values, also is included. For stations that were surveyed by telephone, we have
a series of additional variables measuring station characteristics including indi-
cators for the presence of a car wash and restaurant. A measure of the number
of gasoline pumps, capacity, represents possible economies of scale associated
with larger stations.
A ﬁnal concern is that the local crime rate is correlated with gasoline price
either because of the direct cost of crimes committed or because of indirect
costs due to higher insurance rates or the need to pay compensating diﬀeren-
tials to employees who feel that working at a station in a high crime area is
6All stations in New Jersey are full service. Stations in other states are coded as full service
if they routinely pump gas for customers at any of their pumps.
11risky. Because of the paucity of crime data available at a small geographic level,
researchers typically control for crime at a broad geographic level such as mu-
nicipality or zip code (e.g., Graddy, 1997; Hayes, 2000). We attempt to create
a proxy variable measuring crime at a smaller local level by asking telephone
survey respondents to rank the severity of crime in the neighborhood on a scale
of one to ten and coding stations with ratings in the top third (greater than a
three) as having severe local crime. Although this measure has the advantage of
presumably being more local to a gas station than crime data for the entire mu-
nicipality as supplied by FBI Uniform Crime Reports, it has the disadvantage
of being subjective. We discuss an alternative measure in Section 6.
Competitiveness and Demand
Our model predicts that prices will be higher in neighborhoods where sta-
tions have greater market power because of some combination of fewer com-
petitors and/or more inelastic demand. We measure the number of competing
stations within a 1 kilometer radius of each station in the sample using ArcGIS
software. We proxy for the elasticity of demand using a set of variables that
we expect to relate to search costs. The ﬁrst two, km to nearest interstate
and km to nearest highway, measure the distance from each station to the
nearest limited access highway and major non-limited access highway, respec-
tively. We assume that search costs are lower, and demand is more elastic, for
vehicles traveling on major roads because they will typically encounter more
gasoline stations on a trip. The remaining variables that proxy for demand are
pct commute by car, avg commute time, pct of households with 1 vehicle,
and pct of households with 2+ vehicles. We expect that demand is higher
in areas with more vehicles both because those vehicles require gasoline and
because car ownership is positively correlated with unobserved heterogeneity in
income. However, we also expect that demand is more elastic in areas with
12more vehicles, more commuters, and longer average commutes because search
costs are lower for households that drive more.
4 Empirical Model
The analysis is based on a two-way mixed error component speciﬁcation:
log(Pijt)=α + Njβ + Cijδ + Dijγ + υi + υt +  ijt. (4)
Pijt is the price of regular octane gasoline observed at station i in neighborhood
j on week t. Nj is a vector of racial and income characteristics of neighborhood
j, Cij is a vector of proxies for costs for station i in neighborhood j, and Dij
is a vector of proxies for the competitiveness of station i in neighborhood j.
The error term includes a station-speciﬁc component, υi, and a time-speciﬁc
component, υt. The ﬁnal term,  ijt, represents a classical random disturbance.
The time-speciﬁc component of the error term is treated as a ﬁxed eﬀect so
that identiﬁcation is based on the deviation of station i’s prices from the mean
price observed during week t. Because all of the explanatory variables are time-
invariant, the station component of the error term is by necessity treated as
random.7 The (un-testable) assumption that we must make is that the unob-
served station eﬀects are not correlated with the regressors. Even if this is not
the case, we still are able to address our ﬁrst question– Are gasoline prices higher
in poor and minority neighborhoods?– although we would be unsure whether
any observed relationship is the direct eﬀect of race and income or the result
of some unobserved factor that is correlated with neighborhood and/or station
characteristics.
7For more on two-way error component speciﬁcations, see Baltagi (2008). One might
also wish to consider a three-way error component model with station random eﬀects that
are nested within neighborhood random eﬀects. However, it is very diﬃcult to perform the
computations required to estimate such a speciﬁcation because of the large size of the data
set (5,203 stations in 2,117 neighborhoods observed over 52 weeks).
135 Do gasoline prices vary with neighborhood char-
acteristics?
Table 2 reports the estimated coeﬃcients for the two-way error component spec-
iﬁcation with week ﬁxed eﬀects and station random eﬀects.8 The estimates in
Model 1 indicate the mean price diﬀerentials observed across neighborhoods with
diﬀerent racial and income compositions without additional control variables.
In Model 2 we add the variables measuring cost, competition, and demand char-
acteristics that we are able to observe for all stations in the sample. In Model
3 we add additional control variables for station characteristics obtained via
telephone survey, which reduces the sample size accordingly.9
The estimated coeﬃcients for the variables measuring neighborhood racial
composition are small in magnitude and, with one exception, statistically in-
signiﬁcant. This suggests that there are not large price diﬀerentials associated
with race. The coeﬃcient on percent black in Model 1, for example, indicates
that for a 10 percentage point increase in the percent black in a neighborhood,
retail gasoline prices are about 0.02 percent higher (p-value= 0.15). Once we
control for costs, competition, and demand in Models 2 and 3 this diﬀerential is
of even smaller magnitude, negative, and highly statistically insigniﬁcant. This
suggests that to the extent that (small and statistically insigniﬁcant) positive
price eﬀects of minority composition were observed in Model 1, they can be
accounted for by diﬀerences in costs, competition, and demand. Moreover, the
single result that is statistically signiﬁcant indicates that rather than paying a
premium, prices are actually decreasing with the presence of other residents.
8Speciﬁcation tests support the validity of this speciﬁcation. Breusch Pagan tests indicate
that station random eﬀects are appropriate (p-value< 0.01 for Models 1-3). Hausman tests
also indicate that week ﬁxed eﬀects are appropriate (p-value< 0.01 for Models 1-3). However,
while the diﬀerences in coeﬃcients between models with and without week ﬁxed eﬀects are
statistically signiﬁcant, they are not large in magnitude.
9The results in Model 3 may diﬀer from Model 2 because of the change in the sample as
well as because of the additional control variables. However, if we estimate Model 2 using
only the stations that appear in the sample in Model 3, we get similar point estimates.
14By contrast to the race results, the coeﬃcients on the income measures
are of larger magnitude as well as highly statistically signiﬁcant. Like Frankel
and Gould (2001), we ﬁnd that prices are lowest in neighborhoods with more
lower-middle income families and higher in neighborhoods both with more poor
residents and with more middle-upper income residents. The estimates in Model
1 indicate that for a 10 percentage point increase in the percent of middle-
upper relative to lower-middle income families, retail gasoline prices are 0.48
percent higher (p-value< 0.01). And, for a 10 percentage point increase in
the percent of poor relative to lower-middle income families in a neighborhood,
retail gasoline prices are 0.70 percent higher (p-value< 0.01). At the sample
average gasoline price of $2.86 (net of taxes), a 0.70 percent increase represents
a premium of about $0.02 per gallon of gas. As an alternative way to think
about the magnitude of this eﬀect, consider the spatial variation in gasoline
prices across a city. We observe that the average standard deviation in gasoline
prices observed in a given city on a given day in our sample is about 2.8 percent
of the mean. Hence, a 0.70 percent premium paid for a 10 percentage point
increase in the percent of families in a neighborhood that are poor represents
about a quarter of a standard deviation increase in gasoline prices.
The relationship between income and prices diminishes in Models 2 and 3,
suggesting that the premiums paid in poor and middle-upper income neighbor-
hoods can be partially explained by costs and competition characteristics that
are correlated with income. The estimated coeﬃcient on pct > 2 times poverty
line becomes much smaller as well as statistically insigniﬁcant in Models 2 and
3. The coeﬃcient on the percent of families below the poverty line remains
statistically signiﬁcant in Model 2, although its magnitude is reduced by two-
thirds; for a 10 percentage point increase in the percent of poor families relative
to lower-middle income families, gasoline prices are estimated to be 0.22 per-
cent higher. The corresponding point estimate is 0.37 percent higher in Model
153, although the greatly reduced sample size results in a larger standard error
and a lack of statistical signiﬁcance.
The remaining results in Table 2 are for the most part in keeping with
our expectations and support the validity of our controls. Considering ﬁrst
the coeﬃcients in Model 2, most are statistically signiﬁcant, but, as with the
coeﬃcients for the race and income variables, of small magnitude. The results
indicate that branded gasoline is an average of 1.4 percent more expensive than
unbranded gasoline (p-value< 0.01). We also ﬁnd that fora1p ercent increase in
the median house value, gasoline prices increase by 0.01 percent (p-value< 0.01).
We intend house values to proxy for real estate costs. However, if the eﬀects
of income are not fully accounted for by the poverty status variables and car
ownership variables, the coeﬃcient on house values may also represent an income
eﬀect.
As predicted, gasoline prices are lower in areas with more competition; for
each additional station within a 1 km radius, the average gasoline price is 0.12
percent lower (p-value< 0.01). We also expected that gasoline prices would
increase with distance from both limited and non-limited access highways as
search costs increased. However, we ﬁnd that for each kilometer increase in dis-
tance from an interstate, prices decline by 0.02 percent (p-value< 0.01), while
for each kilometer increase in distance from a highway, prices increase by 0.01
percent (p-value< 0.01). One explanation is that search costs are higher for
consumers on limited access highways because they usually must exit the in-
terstate to observe prices. Of the remaining variables that relate to demand,
only the coeﬃcient on the percent of residents who commute to work by car is
statistically signiﬁcant. For a 10 point increase in the percent of car commuters
in a neighborhood, we estimate that gasoline prices are 0.51 percent lower (p-
value< 0.01). This is in keeping with our expectation that search costs are lower
for people who regularly drive to work and, hence, stations in these areas have
16less power to charge higher prices.
Among the estimated coeﬃcients for the additional variables measuring sta-
tion characteristics in Model 3, only the coeﬃcient for owner present is sta-
tistically signiﬁcant. Gasoline prices are about 0.30 percent higher at stations
where the owner regularly works behind the counter, which are more likely to be
operated by independent business people rather than by wholesalers. The point
estimates for variables in common with Model 2 are quite similar, although
the standard errors are larger because of the reduction in sample size. Overall,
the point estimates from Model 3 suggests that station characteristics do not
explain the the inter-neighborhood price diﬀerentials observed in Model 2.
Taken as a whole, the results in Table 2 indicate that gasoline prices are not
higher in minority neighborhoods. Gasoline prices are slightly higher in poor
neighborhoods (about 0.70 percent higher for a 10 point increase in the percent
poor), and about two-thirds of this diﬀerential is explained by proxies for the
cost, competition, and demand characteristics of these neighborhoods.
Estimates by metropolitan area
Table 3 presents results for Models 1 and 2 estimated separately for the three
metropolitan areas in the sample. A Chow test rejects the null that the coeﬃ-
cients on race and income are identical for the three cities (p-value< 0.01), which
indicates that the relationship between neighborhood characteristics and gaso-
line prices varies geographically. However, the results are, as a whole, similar to
those obtained in the pooled model. We ﬁnd quite small (although statistically
signiﬁcant) relationships between race and gasoline prices, and larger premiums
associated with poverty.
For a 10 percentage point increase in the percent of families living below
the poverty line relative to those living between 1 and 2 times the poverty line,
gasoline prices increase by an average of 0.69 percent in Atlanta, 0.65 percent
17in Detroit, and 1.46 percent in Philadelphia. While this diﬀerential becomes
statistically insigniﬁcant for Atlanta when additional control variables are added
in Model 2, it is smaller but still statistically signiﬁcant in the remaining cities.
Even after accounting for cost, competition, and demand characteristics, prices
are still 0.26 percent higher in Detroit and 0.75 percent higher in Philadelphia for
a 10 percentage point increase in the percent of poor families in a neighborhood.
The relationship between race and income varies across the cities. In At-
lanta, gasoline prices are decreasing in the black and Hispanic composition of
neighborhoods, indicating that prices are actually highest in neighborhoods with
more white residents. Conversely, prices are increasing in black and Hispanic
composition in Detroit and Philadelphia. In Model 1, we estimate that for a 10
percentage point increase in the percent black in a neighborhood, gasoline prices
increase by 0.03 percent in Detroit and by 0.14 percent in Philadelphia. The
diﬀerentials remain statistically signiﬁcant in Model 2. However, although the
relationship between race and price is statistically signiﬁcant in the individual
models, all the coeﬃcients– both negative and positive– continue to be of small
magnitude both absolutely and relative to the income eﬀects. As a whole, the
evidence suggests that the the correlation between race and prices is not large.
6 Explaining the inter-neighborhood price dif-
ferentials
The results in the previous section indicate that gasoline prices increase with the
presence of poor residents in all three cities. The estimated premium diminishes
once we control for observable costs and competitiveness, but remains positive.
We consider three alternative explanations for the diﬀerentials observed both
with income and with minority composition: omitted cost variables, omitted
competition and demand variables, and animus-based discrimination.
18Explanations based on costs
Higher prices in minority and low-income neighborhoods may reﬂect unobserved
higher costs. A particular concern is that our measure of crime, which is avail-
able only for surveyed stations and is based on the respondent’s subjective
opinion, is inadequate. To the extent that crime rates are higher in poor and
minority neighborhoods, and that this, in turn, raises the costs of operating
gas stations there, our estimates of the coeﬃcients on race and income may be
positively biased. To investigate these possibility, we were able to obtain de-
tailed crime information for calendar year 2007 from the City of Atlanta Police
Department (City of Atlanta Police Department, 2007), and then used ArcGIS
to calculate the number of total crimes (violent and property) within a 1 km
radius of each station in its jurisdiction.10 We estimated Model 2 for this small
(n=116) subset of stations both with and without the additional variable mea-
suring crime.11 We do not report, but brieﬂy describe the results here.12 As
expected, the point estimates indicate that higher crime is associated with higher
prices; for a one standard deviation increase in the number of local crimes, we
estimate that gasoline prices are 0.36 percent higher (p-value=0.15). The coef-
ﬁcients on variables measuring race and income, however, are similar to those
reported in Table 3 and robust to the inclusion or exclusion of our measure of
crime. We conclude that unobserved crime heterogeneity is unlikely to explain
the observed inter-neighborhood price diﬀerentials.
Explanations based on imperfect competition
A second possibility for the residual positive price diﬀerentials is that we have
10Stations located near the boundary of the police district were dropped from the sample
because we could not observe crimes in the full 1 km radius around their locations.
11Only 12 of the 116 stations were surveyed by telephone and, hence, have observations of
bad crime from the station survey to compare the crime rate obtained from the Atlanta Police
Department. Of these stations with observations of both variables, the 9 stations reporting
bad crime have a higher average crime rate (560 crimes) than the 3 stations that do not report
bad crime (507 crimes). The small sample size precludes testing for statistical signiﬁcance.
12The full results are available upon request.
19not fully observed lower levels of competition and/or relatively inelastic demand
for gasoline in poor and minority neighborhoods. For instance, residents of
poor, minority neighborhoods may be more likely to shop for goods other than
gasoline at gasoline stations, and may therefore be less responsive to the price
of gasoline.
If the residual income and racial price diﬀerentials are explained by imperfect
competition, we expect that they will be smaller in magnitude for stations that
have less market power. To investigate this possibility, we estimate Model 2 with
the addition of interactions between income composition and three variables
that relate to market power: competing stations within 1km, km to nearest
interestate, and pct commute by car. We expect that price discrimination will
be less likely when there is more competition as measured by the number of com-
peting stations and/or when demand is relatively elastic as measured by being
farther from an interstate or having more commuters in a neighborhood. Ac-
cordingly, when we observe positive price diﬀerentials in poor neighborhoods, we
expect the coeﬃcients on interactions between the poverty rate and competing
stations within 1km, km to nearest interestate, and pct commute by car to
be negative. We also interact these variables will all three racial and ethnic cat-
egories. As with income, we expect the relationship between racial composition
and prices to be attenuated for stations with less market power.
Models 2a-2c in Table A present the estimated coeﬃcients for interactions
between race and income and three variables measuring station competitive-
ness.13 As predicted, the estimated premiums paid in poor and middle-upper
income neighborhoods are smaller for more competitive stations in all three
models, although the diﬀerences are not always statistically signiﬁcant. The
positive and statistically signiﬁcant premium paid in neighborhoods with more
13Separate estimates for the three metropolitan areas are available upon request. Overall,
they are consistent with the results for the pooled model: most of the estimated diﬀerentials
are attenuated for stations with less market power.
20families in poverty decreases with the presence of competing stations (although
the interaction term is insigniﬁcant with a p-value of 0.16), with the percent
of residents who commute by car (p-value<0.01), and with distance from the
interstate (p-value<0.01). For instance, in Model 2a we estimate that the av-
erage gasoline premium for a 10 percentage point increase in the poverty rate
is 0.42 percent for stations with no nearby competitors (p-value= 0.02), but
0.24 percent for stations with 2 competitors within a one kilometer radius (p-
value= 0.02). In Model 2c we estimate that the average gasoline premium for a
10 percentage point increase in the poverty rate is 0.42 percent for stations that
are 1 km from an interstate (p-value< 0.01) and (a statistically insigniﬁcant)
0.26 percent for stations that are 5 km from an interstate (p-value= 0.90).
Similarly, we ﬁnd that the positive premium paid with increasing middle-
upper income families also decreases with increased competition and with in-
creasing demand elasticity. The results for race are, again, mostly statistically
insigniﬁcant. However, the point estimates do suggest that racial price diﬀer-
entials are attenuated in the presence of greater competition. For example, in
Model 2a we estimate that the average gasoline discount for a 10 percentage
point increase in the percent black is 0.03 percent for stations with no nearby
competitors (p-value= 0.28), but that the average discount is 0.01 percent for
stations with 2 nearby competitors (p-value= 0.82).
As a whole, these results are consistent with the explanation that the unex-
plained price diﬀerentials in poor and minority neighborhoods can be accounted
for by unobserved lower competition and/or less elastic demand.
Explanations based on animus-based price discrimination
A ﬁnal possibility is that the unexplained inter-neighborhood price diﬀerentials
may reﬂect animus-based price discrimination on the basis of race or, in the
case of the income diﬀerentials, some factor associated with income that is
21observable to station owners but not to us. If it is the case that the price
diﬀerentials result from animus-based discrimination related to race or income,
we expect that the diﬀerentials will be larger in magnitude at stations in which
the owner is routinely present and, hence, interacts with customers. Model 3a in
Table A reports estimated coeﬃcients when racial and income characteristics are
interacted with the owner present indicator. Although the reduced sample size
in Model 3 again generates large standard errors and the coeﬃcients of interest
are not statistically signiﬁcant, we note that the point estimates are mixed.
The small and statistically insigniﬁcant discounts paid with increasing minority
composition (which would have to suggest animus-based discrimination against
whites) are more negative in the presence of owners in two of the three cases,
but still very small. The statistically signiﬁcant premia paid in neighborhoods
with more poor or middle-upper income residents decrease in the presence of
station owners, which is not consistent with animus-based discrimination.
As a whole, the estimated racial and income price diﬀerentials do not behave
in a manner that is consistent with our predictions of the eﬀects of animus-based
discrimination. However, like most Becker-type models, our theoretical model
allows animus-based discrimination to be maintained only if all stations have a
similar discrimination coeﬃcient. If tastes for discrimination vary in a perfectly
competitive market, discriminating ﬁrms will go out of business. A second,
un-modeled, possibility is that tastes for discrimination vary and that ﬁrms in
less competitive markets are more likely to be able to engage in animus-based
discrimination without being priced out of business. In this case, the attenuated
price diﬀerentials observed at stations with more competition in Models 2a-2c
would be consistent with animus-based discrimination as well as with classic
price discrimination, and the two would not be separable.
227 Conclusion
We have introduced a large and unique data set to examine neighborhood vari-
ation in retail prices. Despite anecdotal evidence of higher prices in minority
neighborhoods, we estimate that any premiums paid for gasoline are quite small.
For instance, for a 10 percentage point increase in the black composition of a
Detroit or Philadelphia neighborhood, gasoline prices are estimated to increase
by about 0.05 percent, or by about 2 cents for a 15 gallon tank at the observed
mean price. The corresponding premium paid in Hispanic neighborhoods is
about 0.20 percent, or about 8 cents for a tank. Moreover, in Atlanta we ﬁnd
evidence of discounts rather than a premium paid with minority composition,
although the magnitude of the discounts is similarly small.
Larger premia are observed in relation to income. On average across the
three cities in the data set, a 10 percentage point increase in poor relative to
lower-middle income families is associated with a 0.70 percent increase in gaso-
line prices. Two-thirds of this diﬀerential can be accounted for by the observable
cost, competition, and demand characteristics of poor neighborhoods. The re-
maining diﬀerential is again smaller for stations that have observably less market
power, suggesting that it may be explained by lower levels of competition and/or
more inelastic demand in poor neighborhoods.
We conclude that the evidence from the market for gasoline indicates that
prices are not greatly inﬂated in minority neighborhoods, but that there is a
small poverty premium that may represent a noteworthy burden for the very
poor living in very poor neighborhoods.
23A Appendix: Station Telephone Survey Method-
ology and Script
The telephone surveys of gasoline stations were conducted by undergraduate
students as part of a class research project. Students piloted an initial script
on approximately 100 stations. The students then worked together during an
afternoon workshop to reﬁne the survey script based on their experience with the
pilot. The reﬁnements included shortening the introduction and several of the
questions. The ﬁnal version of the survey script is replicated below. Surveyors
reported that only a handful of respondents asked for more detailed information
on the nature of the survey.
Survey Script
First verify that you have the correct station. When the respondent answers the
phone, if he or she identiﬁes the station in some way that matches what you
were expecting, simply begin the script. If the respondent does not identify the
station, ask “Hi, is this the [brand] station on [street]?” If it is, continue.
If it is not, say that you have the wrong number and hang up.
Then, ask the respondent if he or she is willing to complete the survey. You
can say whatever feels comfortable, but try to keep it brief and clear. Something
like:
Hi, can I ask you a few questions for a class project? It will only take
a minute.
Wait for response
• No: Thank them and hang up
• Ask you to call back: Record suggested time and call back as instructed
• Ask you for more information: Tell respondent that you are working on
a research project on gasoline prices across neighborhoods. Answer all
questions brieﬂy and truthfully.
• Yes: Proceed with Survey
Great! Thanks very much.
1. Does your station have a car wash?
242. Does your station perform oil changes?
3. Do you sell milk by the gallon?
4. Is there a restaurant like a McDonald’s that is part of your
station?
5. Is your station open 24 hours a day?
6. Does your station pump the gas for customers?
(Question 6 excluded from surveys of New Jersey stations.)
7. How many cars can get gasoline at your station at the same
time?
8. On a scale of 1 to 10, how bad a problem would you say crime
is in your area?
9. Does the owner of your station also work behind the counter?
Thank you very much for you time.
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28Table 1: Descriptive statistics for gasoline stations used in analysis
Full Non-surveyed Surveyed
sample stations stations
Variable Source mean s.d. mean s.d. mean s.d.
Outcome
price OPIS 3.34 (0.16) 3.34 (0.16) 3.36 (0.12)
price net taxes authors 2.86 (0.15) 2.86 (0.16) 2.86 (0.12)
Location
Michigan (d) OPIS 0.31 (0.46) 0.30 (0.46) 0.36 (0.48)
New Jersey (d) OPIS 0.07 (0.26) 0.07 (0.26) 0.05 (0.22)
Pennsylvania (d) OPIS 0.18 (0.38) 0.18 (0.38) 0.22 (0.41)
Georgia (d) OPIS 0.44 (0.50) 0.45 (0.50) 0.38 (0.49)
central city (d) OPIS 0.17 (0.37) 0.17 (0.38) 0.13 (0.34)
competing stations within 1 km ArcGIS 2.13 (1.37) 2.14 (1.37) 2.09 (1.39)
km to nearest interstate ArcGIS 4.29 (4.92) 4.28 (4.84) 4.38 (5.51)
km to nearest highway ArcGIS 5.13 (10.16) 4.95 (9.74) 6.55 (13.01)
Census tract characteristics
pct white Census 68.95 (30.18) 68.52 (30.37) 72.49 (28.35)
pct black Census 21.39 (28.90) 21.79 (29.15) 18.16 (26.53)
pct other Census 4.52 (4.17) 4.52 (4.18) 4.54 (4.13)
pct Hispanic Census 5.13 (8.31) 5.17 (8.38) 4.81 (7.72)
pct below poverty line Census 9.90 (9.30) 10.00 (9.45) 9.01 (7.96)
pct 1 to 2 times poverty line Census 14.09 (7.55) 14.15 (7.54) 13.63 (7.57)
pct > 2 times poverty line Census 76.01 (15.55) 75.85 (15.67) 77.36 (14.48)
people/km2 Census 1301 (1620) 1317 (1649) 1176 (1348)
pct commute by car Census 90.35 (9.38) 90.25 (9.55) 91.17 (7.81)
avg commute time (minutes) Census 30.57 (5.08) 30.64 (5.08) 29.99 (5.00)
pct of households with 1 vehicle Census 33.82 (10.98) 33.81 (10.98) 33.92 (16.84)
pct of households with 2+ vehicles Census 57.02 (17.82) 56.97 (17.94) 57.41 (16.84)
median house value Census 127,787 (65,197) 127,159 (65,159) 132,925 (65,338)
Station characteristics
number of days in sample 250.17 (107.19) 248.54 (107.65) 263.49 (102.55)
branded gasoline (d) OPIS 0.79 (0.40) 0.79 (0.41) 0.81 (0.39)
car wash (d) survey 0.12 (0.33)
oil change (d) survey 0.19 (0.39)
milk (d) survey 0.75 (0.43)
restaurant (d) survey 0.15 (0.36)
24 hours (d) survey 0.45 (0.50)
full service (d) survey 0.23 (0.42)
capacity survey 9.20 (3.99)
bad crime (d) survey 0.45 (0.50)
owner present (d) survey 0.56 (0.50)
n 5203 4636 567
*Descriptive statistics for for all stations in analysis sample and by survey status. Price is the average price observed over the
year for a station. Dummy variables are noted by a (d).
29Table 2: Gasoline price as a function of neighborhood and station
characteristics
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
dep. var: ln(price net taxes) coef se coef se coef se
Race and income composition
pct black 0.00002 0.00001 -2.0x10−6 0.00002 -0.00001 0.00005
pct Hispanic -0.00002 0.00004 -0.00004 0.00004 -0.00004 0.00013
pct other 0.00007 0.00007 -0.00015** 0.00007 -0.00018 0.00022
pct below poverty line 0.00070*** 0.00009 0.00022** 0.00010 0.00037 0.00033
pct > 2 times poverty line 0.00048*** 0.00006 0.00002 0.00007 0.00020 0.00021
Add’l neighborhood
characteristics
central city (d) -0.00490*** 0.00108 -0.00660* 0.00340
density (1,000 ppl/km2) -0.00056** 0.00027 -0.00010 0.00088
pct commute by car -0.00051*** 0.00006 -0.00050** 0.00020
avg commute time (minutes) -0.00009 0.00007 -0.00030 0.00023
pct of households with 1 vehicle 0.00008 0.00008 0.00012 0.00021
pct of households with 2+ vehicles 0.00002 0.00007 0.00003 0.00020
ln(median house value) 0.01105*** 0.00104 0.00884*** 0.00314
Station characteristics
branded gasoline (d) 0.01410*** 0.00069 0.01568*** 0.00220
competing stations within 1 km -0.00117*** 0.00021 -0.00210*** 0.00062
km to nearest interstate -0.00021*** 0.00006 -0.00024 0.00017
km to nearest highway 0.00009*** 0.00003 0.00014* 0.00007
car wash (d) 0.00006 0.00254
oil change (d) 0.00328 0.00259
milk (d) 0.00017 0.00240
restaurant (d) -0.00308 0.00231
24 hours (d) 0.00127 0.00197
full service (d) 0.00257 0.00224
capacity -0.00015 0.00022
badcrime 0.00075 0.00169
owner present (d) 0.00295* 0.00169
state indicators yes yes yes
n 5,203 5,203 567
nT 1,301,636 1,301,636 149,399
*Two-way error component model with date ﬁxed eﬀects and station random eﬀects. Dependent variable is the natural logarithm of
the per-gallon price of regular, unleaded gasoline net of taxes.
*p<0.10 **p<0.05 ***p<0.01
30Table 3: Gasoline price as a function of neighborhood characteristics,
by metropolitan area
Model 1 Model 2
dep. var: ln(price net taxes) coef se coef se
Atlanta
pct black -3.1x10−6 0.00002 -0.00004* 0.00002
pct Hispanic -0.00002 0.00006 -0.00018*** 0.00007
pct other 0.00011 0.00012 0.00001 0.00012
pct below poverty line 0.00069*** 0.00014 0.00010 0.00016
pct > 2 times poverty line 0.00023*** 0.00008 -0.00015 0.00011
Detroit
pct black 0.00003* 0.00002 0.00005** 0.00002
pct Hispanic 0.00008 0.00006 0.00018*** 0.00006
pct other 0.00039*** 0.00010 0.00020* 0.00010
pct below poverty line 0.00065*** 0.00012 0.00026** 0.00013
pct > 2 times poverty line 0.00062*** 0.00008 0.00012 0.00009
Philadelphia
pct black 0.00014*** 0.00004 0.00007* 0.00004
pct Hispanic -0.00005 0.00011 0.00022** 0.00011
pct other -0.00008 0.00016 -0.00050*** 0.00015
pct below poverty line 0.00146*** 0.00024 0.00075*** 0.00025
pct > 2 times poverty line 0.00113*** 0.00014 0.00064*** 0.00016
additional controls no yes
*Two-way error component model with date ﬁxed eﬀects and station random eﬀects. De-
pendent variable is the natural logarithm of the per-gallon price of regular, unleaded gasoline
net of taxes. Additional controls in Model 2 are the same as reported previously: central city,
density, percent commute by car, mean commute time, vehicle ownership, median house value,
branded gasoline, nearby competing stations, and distance to major roads. State indicators
are not included for the Atlanta and Detroit metropolitan areas, which are each contained in
one state, but a New Jersey indicator is included in both models for Philadelphia.
*p<0.10 **p<0.05 ***p<0.01
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